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Throughout the history of the United States, private associations and charity have 
supplemented—and at times surpassed—the government in caring for the most economically 
vulnerable citizens, improving the social and physical infrastructure of neighborhoods, and 
supporting cultural institutions. The American welfare state exists today, as it has for centuries, 
as a project of both public and private aid.
1
 Such interaction (indeed, cooperation) between the 
public and private sectors is not a new phenomenon, but the specific configuration of the 
interaction that has evolved and shifted over time. Factors such as economic growth, governance 
structures, and political ideology have defined and altered the relationship between both the 
public and private sectors and between the sectors and the citizens. For example, private 
settlement houses emerged as the dominant form of charitable urban-aid at the end of the 
nineteenth century, but in the 1930s the New Deal model of public aid and benefits replaced the 
settlement house model. In the 1960s the welfare state entered yet another phase when the 
government began granting public monies to private nonprofit organizations.
2
 The entry of direct 
public subsidy for private nonprofit activities, I argue, marks a significant turning point in the 
history of charity in the United States and of the American welfare state that had profound 
consequences for American cities. 
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With the advent of new public funding streams—and well-funded streams at that—
nonprofits proliferated in number, size, responsibility, and budget.
3
 Government grants and 
contracts underwrote nonprofit programs for preschool and job training, art exhibitions and 
housing construction.
4
 Such a development, in which public monies paid for private programs, 
redefined the relationship between public and private and raised questions about participation, 
accountability, and democratic governance. To those questions activists, bureaucrats, community 
leaders, philanthropists, and politicians all responded with varying answers about how the 
emergent nonprofit field ought to function on the ground. My dissertation, “The Privatization of 
Progress: How the Nonprofit Sector Did (And Did Not) Reshape American Cities,” aims to 
narrate the growth of the nonprofit sector in the second half of the twentieth century and to parse 
out the consequences of such a system at the most local level. Indeed, it is in the economic, 
physical, political, and social changes produced by nonprofit activities, that the results of this 
new funding system are most visible.  
To the extent that the historical literature addresses the role of the nonprofit sector and 
the entry of public funding in the 1960s, work remained focused at the national level.
5
 Michael 
Katz has written extensively about the coexistence and co-evolution of the public and private 
sectors in the American welfare state.
6
 Yet, for the breadth Katz gains in tracing three centuries 
of American political and social history, he sacrifices a close look at how these welfare systems  
have shaped local to communities. Economists, political scientists, and sociologists have, thus 
far, been far more likely to traffic in research on the nonprofit sector.
7
 While useful for their 
theories, data, and contemporary portraits of nonprofits, these works lack a historical explanation 
for why and how the nonprofit sector became and remained such a dominant entity in urban 
development, governance, and service provision. Therefore, my project takes these starting 
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points and adds a historical dimension to create a more comprehensive examination of the roots 
of the modern nonprofit sector and its evolving position in the public-private welfare state. 
This project focuses on Boston, Massachusetts and traces the history of the city and its 
nonprofits over four decades from 1960 to 2000. Fortunately, archival records in Boston exist 
that capture the administrative, financial, and programmatic functions of nonprofits active during 
this period. Yet nonprofits did not act or could not act alone. Equally important are the records of 
various philanthropic foundations that also supported nonprofits. Thanks to the recent acquisition 
of the records of the Ford Foundation by the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), I was able to 
trace the relationship between the Ford Foundation and a core cluster of Boston nonprofits in a 
variety of service areas. Some of these grants were small one time investments, while others 
constituted a much larger commitment of time and resources. These smaller grants include, for 
example, a 1968 grant of $12,500 to the Citizens Housing and Planning Association of 
Metropolitan Boston for “research and planning for reorganization of governmental housing 
function in Boston,” and a 1988 grant of $50,000 to the Dorchester Youth Collaborative to 
“support [a] youth service program to encourage participation in employment and educational 
activities.”8 These smaller grant files reveal much about the day-to-day operations of the 
grantees, but even more can be gleaned about Boston’s nonprofits and their shaping of the city 
from records of the Ford Foundation’s long-term engagements and funding initiatives. These 
constitute the strongest part of the Ford Foundation records. Two Ford grantees, Action for 
Boston Community Development (ABCD), founded in 1962 and the Local Initiative Support 
Corporation (LISC), founded in 1979, had particularly strong relationships with the Ford 
Foundation and received funding upwards of ten million dollars each over the duration of the 
relationship. Not surprisingly, with a heavier investment of funds came a more intimate working 
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relationship between funder and grantee. These two collections tell rich stories about two 
nonprofits and reveal the evolution of a sector in constant motion.  
Dual portraits of ABCD and LISC exhibit two different prescriptions for urban poverty 
and two formulas for blending public and private resources. Both considered partnerships 
between public and private actors as critical to success, but where ABCD prioritized government 
funding in the 1960s and 1970s, LISC turned to the private corporate sector for its primary 
support in the 1980s. Each a product of the historical moment in which they were launched, these 
two organizations emphasized different funding streams based on the availability of funds and on 
efforts to maintain organizational stability. Partially as a reflection of their revenue streams, 
ABCD and LISC also differed in their strategies for urban development and service provision. 
ABCD employed government grants to focus on the social development of poor people through 
improved education, job training, legal services, and individual counseling. LISC, on the other 
hand, leveraged loans and tax incentives to focus on the physical and economic development of 
poor neighborhoods through housing construction, the acquisition and rehabilitation of derelict 
buildings, and the development of local business. Interestingly, both ABCD and LISC sub-
granted the monies they received to a network of nonprofits that then implemented programs and 
projects for urban development. For their shared commitment to improving Boston’s 
neighborhoods, these two organizations adopted different strategies and models that reflect larger 
trends in the nonprofit field as the relationship between public and private continued to play out 
on the ground.   
 
Action for Boston Community Development: Public Grants for Social Renewal  
Though it formally launched in 1962, the idea behind Action for Boston Community 
Development (ABCD) began in 1961 at the Union Club in Boston, where civic leaders joined 
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Boston’s new Development Administrator, Ed Logue, for lunch.9 Based on his reputation at the 
New Haven Redevelopment Authority, Boston Mayor John Collins had brought Logue from 
New Haven to Boston to lead and direct the city’s urban renewal program earlier that year. With 
heavy public investment in the physical renewal of Boston’s downtown and neighborhoods, the 
lack of attention to social renewal troubled those concerned with human development, Logue 
chief among them. These men decided to launch a new organization, one without the history or 
reputation of existing organizations, to attend to “the human side of urban renewal.”10 First 
called the Boston Community Development Program (BCDP), the group applied to the 
Permanent Charity Fund of Boston for planning funds and launched conversations with program 
officers at the Ford Foundation. The fledgling group, incorporated as Action for Boston 
Community Development in 1962, also sought to attract funding from the President’s Committee 
on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime.
11
 Indeed partnering with public agencies became 
central to the mission of ABCD. One strategy memo highlighted the “importance of bringing the 
public and private agencies concerned with the same problem together for consultation and 
discussion.”12 Interest in this federal program drove an emphasis on youth and education in the 
programming and planning of the organization. Narrowing its programmatic focus to a limited 
focus on youth from its stated broad goal to “encourage and promote the improvement of 
community life in the Boston area,” became the first of many shifts ABCD made to appeal to a 
federal grant program.
13
  
 The planning group that launched and advised ABCD as the Board of Directors built the 
organization to oversee demonstration projects operated by other organizations around Boston. 
ABCD itself was never supposed to run programs. As one grant report to the Ford Foundation 
explained, ABCD “was determined to serve as a stimulus and resource to other organizations and 
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agencies and to cooperate with them in the development of new programs, but not itself to 
function as a direct-service agency.”14 Yet developing, partnering and launching programs at 
other sites proved far more complicated and resource laden than ABCD had anticipated. ABCD 
had, it admitted to the Ford Foundation, “grossly underestimated” their work.15 Tensions with 
partner agencies signaled that ABCD frequently failed in its goal to “tread a thin line between 
guidance and recommendation, on the one hand, and outright supervision and control on the 
other.”16 Yet obligations and contract stipulations with private and public agencies required that 
ABCD carefully manage sixteen different demonstration projects scattered around the city 
including: “pre-kindergarten, reading, guidance, school adjustment counseling, tutoring, home-
school relations, ability identification and development, work-study, scholarship, summer camp, 
summer campus programs,” youth job training, three multi-service centers, and a legal services 
program.
17
 Taken together, these programs constituted what ABCD called an “action-research 
project” in its application to the federal government and represented an all-out assault on social 
issues—what ABCD considered the root causes of poverty.18  
Money from the Ford Foundation proved integral to running ABCD, but government 
grants and contracts rapidly expanded the administration, budget, and programs of the fledgling 
organization. Following the model of the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency of 
1963, Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 Great Society and War on Poverty legislation created federal grant 
programs to support local initiatives, including pre-school Head Start programs, job training, 
community organizing, and anti-poverty planning. With an opportunity to bring more federal 
resources into his city, Mayor Collins designated ABCD as the principal anti-poverty agency in 
Boston for federal grant programs in 1964.
19
 By 1965 ABCD operated on a seven million dollar 
budget, built mostly by contracts from the Office of Economic Opportunity ($4.7 million), U.S. 
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Department of Labor ($1.5 million), and the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
($600,000).
20
 It was under the weight of these federal grants that, in the opinion of a Ford 
Foundation program officer, “difficulties set in.”21 Tensions within the staff, partner agencies, 
and the community were exacerbated by a series of unflattering newspaper articles about ABCD, 
alleging the misappropriation of federal monies by the Neighborhood Youth Corps. The U.S. 
Department of Labor immediately froze funds in the fall of 1965, a move that the Ford 
Foundation had already taken in June 1965, following its persistent “dissatisfaction with 
ABCD’s fiscal and administrative procedures.”22 Both funders continued funding the 
organization following their investigations, though the Ford Foundation moved cautiously by 
releasing funds in small increments. Ford Foundation program officers hoped that, “while the 
bulk of ABCD’s funds will come from the federal and city governments, the funds from the Ford 
Foundation would help ensure that ABCD could indeed be more than the common denominator 
of local and national agency interests.” By 1973 ABCD’s annual budget had ballooned to twenty  
million dollars, and while the Ford Foundation continued its support, public contracts indeed 
accounted for the bulk of the organization’s revenue.23   
 The rather unflattering portrait of ABCD’s financial and administrative capabilities 
reflected in the Ford Foundation records, threaten to obscure the important work the organization 
achieved in Boston’s neighborhoods and the resources it brought into the city. By 1966, ABCD 
reported to the Ford Foundation that, with its partner agencies the organization had established 
thirteen low-income credit unions in Boston and involved over five thousand  individuals in 
cooperatives to buy food, furniture, and appliances.
24
 ABCD sponsored Head Start agencies that 
served an estimated five thousand, eight hundred and sixty-five children between 1965 and 
1968.
25
 By June 1968, the Manpower division of ABCD employed over three hundred fifty 
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Bostonians and averaged five hundred placements a month for men, women and youth seeking 
employment, and job training.
26
 Twenty-four attorneys working through the legal services 
division of ABCD assisted low-income clients in twelve neighborhood offices.
27
 Despite these 
very real gains on the ground for individuals, from an organizational standpoint, ABCD 
struggled to maintain accurate and consistent accounting practices, faced funding shortages, and 
battled negative press reports. Yet even with a weak organization, ABCD managed to channel 
millions of public dollars into Boston neighborhoods. So long as ABCD continued to win federal 
contracts and public dollars moved into community programs, the funding occluded problems of 
organizational health. These issues, however, continued to linger just beneath the surface of 
ABCD’s initiatives throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s. The true challenge would arise for 
ABCD and other nonprofits similarly dependent on the constant and consistent flow of federal 
dollars when the streams of public funding dried up. 
 
Local Initiatives Support Corporation:  A Private Solution for Physical Development 
 In contrast to ABCD’s origins in conversations among Boston’s civic elite, the Local 
Initiative Support Corporation (LISC) began as a Ford Foundation program or “Foundation 
Administered Project” that eventually incorporated as an independent nonprofit in 1979. Both 
Ford and its progeny LISC maintained New York based headquarters, but invested in CDCs 
around the nation.
28
 Ford Foundation program officers began the project that eventually became 
LISC in 1971 as a pool of funds available for technical assistance for “minority and economic 
development grants and investments.”29 Each year new funds were added to the project in 
installments ranging from $25,000 in 1974 to up to $800,000 in 1973.
30
 Program officers then 
distributed these funds in small grants to community development corporations (CDCs) around 
the country to strengthen their management and financial operations and to boost their capacity 
9 
 
to take on complex development projects.
31
 During this time CDCs emerged as the drivers of 
neighborhood economic and housing development. Where anti-poverty groups like ABCD 
focused on the social renewal of neighborhoods, CDCs around the nation focused on the physical 
renewal. Throughout the 1970s, housing development became increasingly central to the 
activities and funding of CDCs. Though the Ford Foundation provided funds for CDCs through a 
special funding pot to help them navigate the complex waters of housing finance and accounting, 
it was clear to the program officers that while a promising model, CDCs needed greater 
assistance than individual grants could provide.  
 What differentiated LISC from other nonprofits was that it pivoted toward the private 
sector, rather than the public sector, as a principal source of funding. Certainly foundation 
support—particularly that from the Ford Foundation—was central to LISC’s operation, but 
where ABCD saw public support as central to its operations, LISC viewed private, primarily 
corporate dollars as essential to their field of community development. The Ford Foundation 
launched LISC at a moment when, as an internal policy memo outlined, there existed “a belief in 
and out of government that, for now, public resources to assist local development have probably 
reached their limit.”32 Yet this also appeared to be a moment, according to LISC staff, when 
private corporations seemed to have both a “growing sense of social responsibility” and an 
“enlightened self interest” that investments in urban community development might not just be 
charity, but a sound investment strategy.
33
 In justifying a grant to LISC, Ford Foundation 
program staff explained that “corporate America’s efforts to revitalize deteriorated communities 
can reach well beyond charity and into the realm of investment.”34 With a climate of declining 
public dollars, but potentially increasing corporate dollars for community development, LISC 
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saw its “most important role” as helping “forge wherever possible a productive and continuing 
alliance between community organizations and the local and national private sector.”35  
 The private corporate sector loomed large, not just in LISC’s partnerships and funding 
strategy, but also in its vision of how to strengthen the community development sector. Rather 
than funding operations and programs, LISC’s “primary approach” to community development 
centered on aiding “organizations in increasing and safeguarding their real assets.”36 Taking a 
long-term view of community development, LISC’s strategy, as detailed in internal memos, 
recognized that “an overdependence on fundraising alone inhibits long-range planning, 
discourages investments, and reduces the prospects for effective fiscal management.”37 Yet, the 
memo continued, such long-range planning and predictable revenue proved “essential to the 
more complicated, and often more expensive fields of physical and economic development.”38 
As a result of this thinking, LISC adopted a primary strategy focused on aiding CDCs with 
individual development projects “that produce equity and revenue for the organizations that 
sponsor them.”39 Such directed attention to what LISC policy guidelines referred to as the “asset 
side of the balance sheet” made LISC a pioneering nonprofit that saw financing and the use of 
capital as “a means, and a practical one, to the end of overall organizational growth.”40 Again, in 
an effort to steer CDCs away from what they saw as the unreliable funding strategy of public 
sector grants and contracts, LISC aimed to “encourage and support … business discipline 
necessary to raise and invest their own funds most effectively.”41 The development of “revenue-
generating projects” for CDCs emerged as the key means for LISC to attempt to improve the 
community development field, and, by extension, urban communities. 
 To achieve the goal of boosting the asset base of CDCs through the support of individual 
development projects, LISC developed what they called their four principal “vehicles of 
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assistance:” loans, loan guarantees, grants, and technical assistance.42 Among the available 
options, loans and loan guarantees emerged as the preferable means of assistance, because a loan 
or loan guarantee “can serve to leverage a much larger pool of funds from private lenders,” 
according to LISC strategists.
43
 Initially, LISC operated as a single funding pool, capitalized with 
ten million dollars from “six major insurance, industrial, and banking firms, the Charles Stewart 
Mott Foundation and the Ford Foundation” that directed grants around the country.44 One year 
into operations, LISC launched an “areas of concentration” program that created locally-based 
capital pools of funding to direct corporate funding to specific cities. 
 Boston emerged early as a target area for LISC funding and support—both for the 
strength of its existing CDCs and for the availability of private funds interested in entrepreneurial 
investment strategies. The first round of funding initiated by LISC in 1981 raised $804,000 for 
the city. In this initial pool both banks and foundations contributed funds, but the largest gift by 
far was $500,000 from the Permanent Charity Fund of Boston. Grants of $25,000 each from 
Shawmut Bank of Boston and John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance were far more typical for 
corporate investors.
45
 By the end of 1984, LISC and its partners had invested $2,545,838 in 
Boston ($1,882,737 in loans and guarantees, plus $663,101 in grants).
46
 In comparison to other 
areas of concentration, Boston ranked third for LISC support, outpaced only by California and 
Chicago (each over the three million dollar mark). That Boston ranked so highly reflected both 
the availability of private capital in Boston, and the apparent promise of the return on 
investments from the earlier successes of preexisting community development activities.   
 Consistent with LISC’s strategy, Boston CDCs received a combination of grants and 
loans—often with a single organization receiving both loans and grants to support development 
projects. For example, the Dorchester Bay Economic Development Corporation (DBEDC) 
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received a loan of $115,000 from LISC as “bridge financing to cover costs during construction” 
of a four story 20,000 square foot commercial building in Dorchester that the CDC had acquired 
and planed to rehabilitate in 1983.
47
 Dorchester Bay also received a grant from LISC of $11,250 
to “pay for a portion of the project manager’s salary.”48 A year after DBEDC received the bridge 
loan, a commercial tenant had moved into the new facility and repayment on the loan had begun 
with an expectation of full repayment by 1985.
49
 Other funding supported the construction of 
affordable housing. A 1980 loan of $250,000 to Inquilinos Boricuas en Accion (IBA) contributed 
to the twelve million dollar cost of a project to construct one hundred ninety units of affordable 
housing under the HUD Section 8 program.
50
 By 1983, IBA had completed construction, rented 
out all units, and used rental income to repay the loan in full with eight percent interest. To 
further IBA’s potential to develop commercial and residential properties, LISC made several 
grants between 1981 and 1983 to IBA to “assess IBA’s overall operations and management,” to 
develop “a business plan for IBA’s economic development division,” and to “expand IBA’s 
capabilities in commercial real estate management and development.”51 These individual grants 
and loans increased the availability of affordable housing in Boston and boosted the capacity of 
CDCs to continue to produce more housing and commercial opportunities in struggling 
neighborhoods.  
 The IBA project in 1981, known as Viviendes II, was among LISC’s first successfully 
completed and repaid loans. It became a signature project on which LISC proved its model. As 
LISC boasted in its annual report, the full repayment of the loan to IBA “demonstrat[ed] that 
when social investments are properly structured and secured they can return in full principal and 
interest to the lender for reuse in future projects.”52 This realization that loans to nonprofit 
entities and investments in affordable housing could be repaid with interest flew in the face of 
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philanthropy and public grants/contracts that dominated in the 1960s and 1970s. Assessing the 
early years of LISC’s performance, one outside evaluator described the organization as having 
“an undeviating commitment to the most impoverished communities in America, but is not 
interested in giving money away.”53 Indeed, this was not a group interested in being equitable 
with its resources, but instead was interested in strategy, results, and organizational strength. 
Continuing, the evaluation labeled LISC in the following direct way: “It unabashedly ‘creams.’ It 
takes the best deals. It rarely spreads the wealth around. If it wins with a community group, it 
goes back to them. It feels no obligation to be ‘fair.’”54 With the novelty of the LISC program 
and its loans to community groups, the evaluator commented, “The original surprise in LISC is 
that the business works at all. The biggest surprise is that it works so often.”55 As LISC’s 
president wrote to a Ford Foundation program officer that the experiment in LISC had, to the 
surprise of many, proved the possibility that corporate dollars could “reach well beyond charity 
and into the realm of investment.”56 
 LISC’s asset based strategy for supporting CDC activity and its reliance on private 
corporate funding was not entirely without challenges. Certainly LISC had steered CDCs away 
from a dependence on public funding during a time of contracting government grants. Indeed, 
LISC, and a few other organizations like it, managed to reshape the community development 
field, draw corporate funding into urban housing and economic development, and provide 
technical assistance to build the capacity of CDCs to manage real estate assets, but, was a 
strategy based on real estate acquisition any more insulated from swings in the economy? Such a 
strategy required a stable real estate market and easy access to credit. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
these two key ingredients appeared to be a sure thing—but, then again, the constant flow of 
government grants appeared to be a sure thing to ABCD in the 1960s. A reliance on asset 
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acquisition left many CDCs with little cash and a need to keep new projects in the pipeline to 
support staff and overhead costs associated with running the organization. In the end, LISC’s 
strategy had successfully boosted the asset base of CDCs, but failed to insulate these community 
development groups from financial shortfalls.  
The assumptions behind both ABCD’s and LISC’s models of urban development proved 
misleading as a near singular focus on either public or private funding tied nonprofit 
organizations, and by default, neighborhood stability, to swings in politics and the economy. 
Indeed, even while an unwavering commitment to improving urban communities remained 
constant, most aspects of nonprofits changed between the 1960s and 1980s. These two cases 
reveal a sector in motion trying to adapt to shifting funding environments and experimenting 
with different means of improving urban communities. Further research into the communities 
these groups served is necessary to fully evaluate the local consequences of charging private 
nonprofits with public funds and responsibilities for urban development. Nevertheless, records at 
the RAC, notably the Ford Foundation Papers, constituted a critical first step in this historical 
evaluation.   
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